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SUMMARY: The article assesses the influence of Thucydides on Hobbes’ 
conception of man and, more generally, on his model of “Civil Science”. That 
influence is traced back to the time when Hobbes worked on his translation of 
Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War. At that time already, Hobbes 
described Thucydides as “the most politic historiographer that ever writ”. The 
main thesis of the article is that Hobbes’ admiration for Thucydides can be best 
explained by his ability to describe political conflict. This thesis is supported 
by a comparative analysis of some important themes in Thucydides’ historical 
narrative and a number of major theoretical statements of Hobbes’ anthropology 
and political theory. There is a remarkable similarity between Hobbes’ account 
of the three principal causes of conflict between individuals in the state of nature 
– competition, diffidence and glory – and the three main instincts of man to 
which the Athenians appeal to justify their striving for power in a speech that 
Thucydides relates. However, Thucydides exerted the most powerful influence on 
Hobbes by his descriptions of internal war. The final part of the article examines 
two topics from Thucydides’ famous description of the stasis which took place 
in Corcyra – the impossibility of justice and the perversion of language in time 
of sedition.*
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As Reinhart Koselleck wrote, “Hobbes’ doctrine of the State grew out of 
the historical situation of civil war” [Koselleck 1988: 23]. It is therefore not 
surprising that one historian exerted decisive influence on Hobbes. As is well 
known, that historian was Thucydides, the author to whom we owe the most 
* This article was written within the framework of the research project 179039 of the Institute 
of Social Sciences in Belgrade Structural Social and Historical Changes of the Serbian Society in 
the Context of European Integration and Globalization, financed by the Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.
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impressive descriptions of civil wars in ancient Greece. Some interpreters of 
Thucydides went so far as to consider his life’s work – The Peloponnesian War – as 
an unfinished history of one long civil war that inflamed Greece in Pericles’ 
time. Thucydides’ influence on Hobbes was deeper and wider still. It shaped 
the main features of Hobbes’ conception of human nature, as well as some 
central arguments of his political theory.
THUCYDIDES’ EXCELLENCE
Hobbes was deeply critical of the intellectual authorities of classical an-
tiquity. He described the reception of Aristotle’s, Cicero’s and Seneca’s works 
which took place in independent universities of his time as one of the sources 
of the greatest evils in political life ‒ of rebellion and civil war. Hobbes censures 
ancient Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle, not only for their teachings 
on man and state, but also for their metaphysics, as well as for their misconcep-
tions of knowledge, which they handed down to posterity. However, Hobbes’ 
polemic against ancient Greek authors reaches its climax when it comes to their 
political ideas, above all to their concept of civil liberty and to its modern inter-
pretations [Hobbes 1968: 261‒268, 682‒703; EW VI: 216‒218, 233]. In Hobbes’ 
view, the common trait of these political conceptions lies in the fact that they 
subvert the only sound principle of political science – the one of absolute sov-
ereign power, which all citizens must obey as the sole provider of their safety 
and protection. Hobbes thought that the dissemination of ancient Greek ideals 
in the culture of Christian Europe contributed to the decay of what he saw as 
the most important virtue of the citizen, his obedience to public authority. 
For Hobbes, Thucydides was an exception among Greek authors. The first 
work that Hobbes published under his name was a translation of Thucydides’ 
The Peloponnesian War. This was, at the same time, its first translation from the 
Greek (in Emilio Porta’s edition) into English. In fact, the only earlier transla-
tion of Thucydides into English had been done from a translation into French 
by Claude de Seysell. However, even that was not taken from the original Greek 
but from a Latin translation made by Lorenzo Valla. Furthermore, according 
to Hobbes, Valla had used a less perfect version than the one he had at his 
disposal. Hobbes invested much effort in translating the book. Among other 
things, he enriched his translation with maps, one of which was drawn by 
himself, taking into consideration several ancient sources [EW VIII: ix–x; 
Schlatter 1945: 350‒352].
Hobbes held Thucydides in extremely high regard. In the two texts he 
published alongside his translation – “A preface to the readers” and a short essay 
entitled “On Thucydides’ life and history” – he described Thucydides’ merits 
as a historian in superlatives. According to Hobbes, Thucydides is an author 
“in whom /…/ the faculty of writing history is at its highest” [EW VIII: vii]. 
The reason of Thucydides’ excellence is that he fulfills the true task of a his-
torian, which consists in reporting the course of events and not in speculating 
on them or in moralizing: the nature of history is, according to Hobbes, “purely 
narrative”. Following this principle of writing history, Thucydides does not 
insert his own personal thoughts into his report of the Peloponnesian War, nor does 
he lecture on politics or morality, but limits himself to narrating the sequence 
of events. As Hobbes admits, the only exception to this are the speeches of 
historical actors, which Thucydides had partially to reconstruct taking into 
account the circumstances in which they were delivered [cf. PW I: 38–39]. This 
method, according to Plutarch’s expression, makes Thucydides’ reader a spec-
tator who looks upon historical events with his own eyes, which is the reason 
why Thucydides deserves the title of “the most politic historiographer that ever 
writ” [ЕW VIII: viii; cf. Plutarch 1962: 500‒503].
How should we understand this conclusion? There is no doubt that Hobbes 
read many of his own political preferences into the life and work of Thucydides. 
When he says that it is manifest that Thucydides, of all forms of government, 
least liked democracy [EW VIII: xvi], and that he himself had learned from 
him how incompetent democracy is [Hobbes 1839: I, lxxxviii], his judgment 
is in accordance with the antidemocratic reputation of Thucydides widely 
shared by posterity. One could even say that Hobbes is more prudent than those 
who ascribe to Thucydides oligarchic sympathies [EW VIII: xvi; cf. Pope 1988: 
276]. And yet, his thesis that Thucydides most valued the third, “regal” form 
of government could hardly be sustained. The only argument supporting this 
view is Thucydides’ obvious reverence for Pericles, whose rule is described in 
The Peloponnesian War as democratic in name, but monarchical (“rule of the 
first man”, as Thucydides says) in reality [EW VIII: xvii; PW I: 376–377]. This 
is why Hobbes tries to corroborate his views on Thucydides’ political affinities 
by emphasizing his Thracian regal descent and by reminding of the gold mines 
that were the source of his family’s fortune. Hobbes describes the exile in which 
the former Athenian general wrote his magnum opus as an aristocratic retreat 
to privacy, which was only temporarily interrupted due to an unavoidable 
service to the state, which ended in disaster. He also reports that Thucydides 
purposely “forbore to come into assemblies” and avoided the multitude, which 
is always in love with itself and eager to hear flattery [EW VIII: xvi–xviii].
However, the eminently “political” character which Hobbes assigns to 
Thucydides’ history is obviously not based on political bias. For example, Hob-
bes defends Thucydides’ objectivity from the criticism of Dionysius of Hali-
carnassus, who believed that the author of The Peloponnesian War as a histo-
rian had had a duty, in which he failed, to place himself on the side of his city 
and to remove from his work all elements that could cause damage to the 
honour of his city [EW VIII: xxv–xxvi]. One can assume that what Hobbes 
considers as the eminently political character of Thucydides’ history comes 
from its essential contribution to political science: for Hobbes, “the most pol-
itic historiographer” means: “the one who best understood politics”.
Hobbes’ characterization of Thucydides could be partly explained by the 
ambiguity which is constitutive for the classical concept of politics. When 
writing his preface to The Peloponnesian War, Hobbes took the word “politics” 
in its Aristotelian sense, which refers not only to the practice of politics, but 
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also to the science thereof.1 Not more than a decade later, Hobbes himself 
would take the most important step towards resolving this ambiguity, by laying 
the foundations of a new science of politics, called “civil science”. Hobbes 
would conceive this science as an exact discipline, capable of overcoming the 
deficiencies of the old politics: for Aristotle, politics was a subdivision of the 
“philosophy of human nature”, which, due to the nature of its subject matter, 
is not capable of scientific demonstration [Aristotle 2009: 106, 203]. On the 
contrary, in his first systematic works, Hobbes considers this new, true politi-
cal science as the only possible guide for political action [EW I: 8–10].
At the time when his texts on Thucydides are being written, Hobbes 
doesn’t have this new concept of political science at his disposal yet. However, 
he already explains the superiority of the Greek historian in terms of his ability 
to teach his readers about what matters most in politics, for which history pro-
vides much empirical evidence. However delightful it might be, the observation 
of the flow of historical events is not an end in itself. The purpose of history 
is to “to instruct and enable men, by the knowledge of actions past, to bear 
themselves prudently in the present and providently towards the future” [EW 
VIII: vii].2 That knowledge involves the understanding of the motives of po-
litical actors, which Thucydides scarcely mentions: as Hobbes says, he does 
not speculate about hidden intentions or unspoken thoughts of historical char-
acters. However, Thucydides’ distinction as a historian lies in the fact that his 
presentation of the sequence of historical events puts the reader in the position 
of a witness who “may from the narrations draw out lessons to himself, and 
of himself be able to trace the drifts and counsels of the actors to their seat”, 
which is located in their heart [EW VIII: viii].
There is another explanation of Hobbes’ view on Thucydides as “the most 
political historiographer”, which does not contradict the previous one. It con-
cerns Thucydides’ ability to present conflict, which is an essential feature of 
politics. To be sure, Hobbes assigned to his new political science, with its central 
doctrine of the sovereign power, the task of eliminating conflicts from social 
life, its pacification or “neutralization” [Schmitt 1982: 61–78]. But this precisely 
means that conflict was axiomatic for him, especially in the form of internal 
political discord or civil war. In this respect, it can be stated that the principal 
stimuli for the development of Hobbes’ program came directly from Thucy-
dides’ history. This is true, above all, of Thucydides’ depiction of the worst pos-
sible form of political conflict, civil strife or sedition (stasis), but also of some 
other themes in his work.
1 In spite of the demise of the Aristotelian concept of politics at the beginning of the modern 
age, the ambiguity of the word “politics” subsisted until the 19th century. This is evidenced by the 
survival of the university discipline of the same name, which was later to be changed, for the 
purpose of scientific objectivity, to “political science” [Ritter 1969: 106–107].
2 Neither does this view contradict Aristotle, in principle at least. In the preface to the 
translation of The Peloponnesian War the absence of Hobbes’ later harsh criticism of the Greek 
philosopher is noticeable. Nevertheless, notwithstanding all his admiration for Thucydides, Hobbes 
is content to grant him the place of honour among historians only – the one which he gives to 
Homer among poets, to Aristotle among philosophers and to Demosthenes among rhetoricians 
[EW VIII: vii].
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THE DIALECTICS OF DIFFIDENCE AND  
THE HAPPINESS OF MAN
Thucydides’ influence on Hobbes was considerably greater than could be 
assumed from the number of times he mentions the historian’s name. In order 
to appraise it, it is necessary to engage in the interpretation of the writings of the 
two authors. 
The most conspicuous confirmation of Thucydides’ influence on Hobbes 
can be found in the 13th Chapter of Leviathan. It is dedicated to the description 
of the state of nature, which, in theory, precedes the emergence of the common-
wealth. The main characteristic of the state of nature is universal conflict among 
men, or “the war of all against all”: it is worth noting that civil war is one of the 
examples which Hobbes cites to bring his notion of the state of nature closer to 
the mind of his readers. In this state, everybody is perfectly free. However, their 
freedom is not of much value, since it constantly conflicts with the freedom 
of others. And as all men are more or less equal as to their mental and physical 
capacities, no one is capable of protecting themselves from others in a durable 
and efficient manner [Hobbes 1968: 183–184]. This is to say that the state of 
nature is as unbearable as civil war. In order to escape it, men must forsake their 
freedom and submit to a sovereign power. 
However, what are the causes of this general conflict or quarrel between 
people? According to Hobbes, these are the three basic drives which are rooted 
in human nature itself: competition, diffidence and glory. Each of them has an aim 
towards which it is directed: gain, safety and reputation [Hobbes 1968: 184–185]. 
Thus, people enter into conflict with each other either because 1) they desire the 
same thing, which they cannot share with others, or 2) they fear – rightfully or not 
– that their neighbors will do harm to them, which they try to prevent, or 3) they 
want to distinguish themselves from others, because they value themselves more.
Hobbes’ inventory of the principal causes of quarrel between people re-
produces, point for point, a theme from a speech which the Athenian embassy 
at Sparta delivered in answer to the accusations made by the Corinthians, 
Lacedaemonian allies, shortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The 
Corinthians claimed that Athens had, with its military operations in Potidaea, 
offended the interests of the Peloponnesian alliance and thereby broken the 
peace treaty on the delimitation of the spheres of influence of 445 B.C. [PW I: 
108–109, cf. 42-43]. The answer of the Athenians is modulated in two similar 
utterances, which amount to a single statement: accused of having endeavoured 
to increase the power of their polis to excess, the Athenians say that they had 
simply acted under the compulsion of the strongest human instincts, which are 
natural, eternal and common to all mankind, and to which therefore nothing can 
be objected: they were “influenced chiefly by fear, then by honour also, and 
lastly by self-interest as well”. Manifestly, “fear” (deos) corresponds to Hobbes’ 
“diffidence”, “honour” (timê) to his “glory”, and “self-interest” (ôphelia) to his 
“competition” [PW I: 126–129].3
3 Hobbes translates the three terms respectively as „fear“, „honour“ and „profit“ [EW VIII: 
81]. The similarity between the texts of Thucydides and Hobbes has often been pointed to [cf. Scott 
2000: 122, 134, with references to literature].
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Even if there could be any doubts about the strict conceptual correspond-
ence between Hobbes’ and Thucydides’ terms, for which there is no reason, 
one thing is certain: the structure of the argument of the Athenian embassy 
exhibits the same dialectics of diffidence which is at work in Hobbes’ description 
of the “state of nature”, “war of all against all”, or civil war. In fact, as they say 
themselves, the Athenians became concerned for their safety – which led them 
to persist in their striving for power – when they had become aware that the 
Lacedaemonians had become suspicious and hostile toward them [PW I: 129]. 
In like manner, the Corinthians censure their Lacedaemonian allies for their inert-
ness, inciting them to adopt, for the future at least, a strategy of “preventive war” 
against Athens: it would have been prudent for Sparta to destroy the power of 
her enemies at its inception, and not now, when it has doubled itself [PW I: 
112–113]. This confirms the principal thesis of Thucydides’ work that Sparta’s 
fear of the growth of Athenian power was the principal cause of the Pelopon-
nesian War [PW I: 42–43]. At the same time, the argument fits excellently into 
Hobbes’ description of the state of nature. Indeed, we come upon a very sim-
ilar idea in the following passage of his book On the Citizen, which concerns 
the precautions to be taken against one’s future enemy: “Since the right of 
protecting ourselves according to our wills, proceeded from our danger, and 
our danger from our equality, it is more consonant to reason, and more certain 
for our conservation, using our present advantage to secure by taking caution, 
than when they shall be full grown and strong, and got out of our power, to 
endeavour to recover that power again by doubtful fight” [EW II: 13].
There are many other traces of the influence of Thucydides’ work on Hobbes’ 
conceptions. One of the episodes of the Peloponnesian War deserves particular 
attention, all the more so because Hobbes extensively commented on it. It re-
produces a dialogue between the Athenian embassy and the leaders of the small 
Aegean island Melos, which is even nowadays considered to be one of the best 
examples of imperialist discourse [PW III: 154–179]. In this dialogue, the 
Athenian generals confront the Melian rulers, who wish to maintain their 
neutrality in the conflict between Athens and Sparta, with the ultimate choice 
– either to completely submit to Athens by entering the Athenian maritime 
alliance, or else to have their city destroyed after the defeat by an overwhelm-
ingly stronger enemy. In the moment when the negotiations began, the Athe-
nian war fleet had already been anchored just off the island.
Thucydides wrote that the Athenians refused to discuss with the Melians 
the issue of the justice of their proposal. That was the reason why Dionysius 
of Halicarnassus reprimanded him for saying things which harm the dignity 
of his city. While presenting an apology of his author, Hobbes goes so far as to 
defend the point of view of the Athenian embassy, saying that the generals had 
not been authorized by the Athenian people to debate questions of equity and 
report the outcome back to the assembly, but had simply been ordered “to take 
in the island by all means whatsoever”, regardless of their justice [EW VIII: 
xxviii–xxix]. Another point of the dialogue is worth noting, although Hobbes 
says nothing about it here. The choice between the vital interest of security or 
salvation (asphaleia, sotêria) and the complete destruction and death as the 
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most terrible things (ta deinotata), as it is presented in the speech of the Athenian 
embassy, is of central importance for Hobbes’ argument in Leviathan about 
the reason why it is necessary to establish a commonwealth: the danger of 
violent death, which is a constant threat in the state of nature, and which Hob-
bes himself describes as the most terrible thing which can befall a man, requires 
the founding of a political community in which the security of every citizen 
will be protected [PW III: 160–163, 168–169; Hobbes 1968: 186, 223–225]. 
The Melians, absolutely inferior to the Athenians in military regard, nev-
ertheless asked the Athenian ambassadors what their advantage or profit would 
be if they agreed to submit to a foreign power. The answer to this was that the 
“profit” would consist in avoiding death, which is the greatest evil of all. This 
assertion could be understood as an expression of overt brutality and cynicism. 
However, Hobbes was able to find in it an inspiration for his criticism of the 
Aristotelian notion of the highest good as a final goal toward which all human 
life is directed or, at least, to find in it a confirmation of this criticism. Taking 
into account the differences among different people’s desires, there can be no 
such thing as the highest good (summum bonum) which would be common to 
all humans, if it is not their self-preservation and things that foster it. How-
ever, the “greatest evil” (primum malum) is the same for everyone – death, 
particularly “a death in pain”. One could say that what is called the highest or 
the first good, is nothing but the avoiding of death, because all other things 
which are held to be good presuppose one’s own conservation [Hobbes 1968: 
160; Hobbes 1839: II, 98].
The connection between Thucydides’ work and the fundamental concep-
tions of Hobbes’ anthropology and philosophy of morality can be followed still 
further. In the abovementioned speech of the Corinthian embassy, the Atheni-
ans are presented as the exact opposite of the passive Spartans, who are defen-
sive and not prone to conquering, because they rather desire to preserve what 
they already have than to obtain something new. On the contrary, the Atheni-
ans “toil, with hardship and dangers, all their life long; and least of all men 
they enjoy what they have because they are always seeking more, because they 
think their only holiday is to do their duty, and because they regard untroubled 
peace as a far greater calamity than laborious activity” [PW I: 118–121]. There 
can be little doubt that Hobbes had in mind this passage when he wrote, in 
Leviathan, the following lines about man in general: “the felicity of this life, 
consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied”; quite the reverse, it is “a con-
tinuall progresse of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the 
former being still but the way to the later” [Hobbes 1968: 160]. 
This progress has no limit or end, in much the same way as the strength-
ening of empire in the description of Thucydides, whose work as a whole re-
flects how, in the minds of historical actors, the measures undertaken to ensure 
safety for Athens required a continual increase of power. Hobbes applied this 
view to all mankind, whose “general inclination” is the “perpetual and restlesse 
desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death” [Hobbes 1968: 161]. It 
is obvious that he projected the features which Thucydides attributed to indi-
viduals and political collectivities on the nature of man.
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THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR: POLEMOS OR STASIS? 
Many interpreters of Thucydides consider his accounts of the internal war 
which took place in particular poleis as the most significant part of his work. 
This view is sometimes related to the belief that the condition of civil war, 
strife or stasis represents the crystallization point of the entire conflict which 
Thucydides’ work depicts. Volkmann-Schluck has stated that the Peloponnesian 
War was, because of the complicated system of alliances which came to be 
established in Greece, the first conflict which, as to its origin and course, 
displayed the characteristics of a “political” war [Volkmann-Schluck 1977: 15]. 
That author saw the “monster” of civil war – the word is presumably an allu-
sion to Hobbes’ Behemoth – as a sort of ideal type: according to him, civil war 
is the sharpest and the most intensive form of political conflict, which enables 
us to discern the ultimate significance even of those conflictual conditions 
which have not yet developed fully and to the extreme [Volkmann-Schluck 
1977: 60]. According to a more recent interpretation, Thucydides saw the Pelo-
ponnesian War not exactly as polemos, but as one immense internal war, which 
spread across the whole Greek world and its neighbouring areas. Stasis is thus 
raised to the role of the model of the entire conflict which is the object of 
Thucydides’ history [Price 2004: 3, 67–73]. Those statements, which contain 
part of the truth, require further explanation.
Thucydides, of course, distinguishes armed conflict between poleis (po-
lemos) from civil war or bloody strife within the city (stasis), even though in 
his time this conceptual distinction was not yet fully developed in philosophy.4 
Nevertheless, stasis and polemos were conceived of as poles apart long before 
Thucydides’ time. They also had opposite value-loading, which is evidenced 
in Greek tragedy. Thus, for example, Athena in Aeschylus’ Eumenides dis-
suades the goddesses of revenge, the Erinyes, from implanting in her people 
the spirit of intestine war (Arê emphylion), and calls instead for war against 
the external enemy (polemos) [Aeschylus 1926: 354–355; Loraux 1987: 101]. 
The Erinyes comply with this and pray that stasis may never come into the 
polis and that the blood of the citizens may not be shed in internal strife, but 
that they may live in a spirit of mutual love, unanimous in their hatred towards 
the external enemy [Aeschylus 1926: 364; cf. Meier 1990: 116]. Democritus 
would later say that stasis is an evil that befalls both the winners and the losers, 
which indirectly shows the advantage of interstate war which, as a rule, benefits 
one of the warring parties [Diels 1922: II, 110 = Democritus B 249; cf. Loraux 
1987: 106].
The view that stasis is a flaw of the city is as old as Solon’s poetry. Solon 
described civil strife as “the common evil” (dêmosion kakon) which destroys 
many in the flower of their youth; it comes to everyone’s house, jumps over 
the highest wall and finds them even while they are hiding in the most remote 
4 In spite of certain reservations as to the translation of the Greek term stasis with the 
syntagm “civil war”, which rather corresponds to the Latin bellum civile [Loraux 1987: 110], it is 
occasionaly used in this text to refer to internal conflicts in ancient Greece. Hobbes, as a rule, 
translates stasis as „sedition“, sometimes as „commotion“ [EW VIII: 28, 338, 347].
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angle of the room. Stasis is a misery, “an inescapable wound” (helkos aphykton) 
in the body of the polis. However, this personified strife is not some sort of 
mystical or inexplicable force. According to Solon’s elegy, it stems from the 
aristocrats’ unscrupulous desire for wealth, which creates slavery in the polis, 
while slavery, in turn, “awakens” (epegeirei) discord [Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 
86–87; Loraux 1987: 107–108].
However, the contrast between stasis and polemos in Solon’s fragment is 
perhaps not as sharp as it would become a few generations after his time. For 
example, Solon calls stasis an intestine or domestic war (stasin emphylon 
polemon) [Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 86], thus bringing the two concepts closer 
than we would expect. With regard to the later emphasis of the advantages of 
polemos over stasis, as well as Solon’s own condemnation of civil strife, the 
combination of the two words is somewhat surprising.5 But something else 
can be inferred from Solon’s verses too: his metaphor of “awakening” civil 
strife seems to imply that it always “sleeps” in the polis: the danger of stasis 
always remains virtually present. This means that there is a fundamental con-
nection between stasis and politics. A provision of Solon’s law, which is at first 
sight perplexing, speaks in favour of this interpretation. According to Aristo-
tle’s testimony, those who refused to choose sides in civil strife were punished 
by loss of civil rights – by exclusion from participation in the life of the polis, 
which for the Greeks was the most severe punishment [Aristotle 1935: 30–31]. 
Civil strife is truly an “inevitable” wound, also in the sense that it imposes a 
choice which can be avoided only at the price of losing political existence. 
Stasis is thus inseparable from the very sense of politics.
The connection between stasis and the dimension of politics in the sense 
of choosing one’s side, which excludes neutrality, can be traced back to the 
etymology of the word. The noun stasis is derived from the verb histêmi (“set 
up”, “make to stand”, “bring to a standstill” or “stand still”), and originally 
meant nothing more than “placing”, “position”, “the place in which one stands”, 
and therefore “standpoint”. Gradually, the word came to mean “party”, later 
still, “party with seditious purposes”, and finally, “division”, “discord” and 
“civil strife” [Liddell/Scott 1996: 1634]. This semantic evolution seems to be 
pretty unusual, since a term which originally denotes stillness or stability 
acquires at the end the meaning of internal war and political overturn, which 
would rather make us think of movement: indeed, at the beginning of his work, 
Thucydides described the Peloponnesian War as the “greatest movement (kinêsis) 
that had ever stirred the Hellenes” [PW I: 2].
However, this peculiarity is not hard to explain. One standpoint, insofar 
as it is opposed to other standpoints, always remains a potential source of 
political discord. Even in modern languages words like “standpoint” or “posi-
tion” have similar conflictual implications. To the same group belong some of 
the English terms which in Hobbes’ works always have a pejorative meaning 
since they denote potential causes of political dissension and ultimately civil 
5 According to one hypothesis, Solon „purposefully presents civil strife as polemos“ in 
order to suggest „that the city’s leaders treat Athens as if it were a foreign conquest whose goods 
are distributed among the victors“ [cf. Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 248].
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war: “sedition”, and the adjective which is derived from it, “seditious” (which 
Hobbes, as a rule, applies to perilous doctrines or people), as well as “faction”. 
As was rightly noted, Hobbes believed that there is “incipient war /…/ in the 
facts of how individual appetites and aversions are naturally formed” [Sorell 
2001: 132]. This statement also applies to differences between opinions which, 
if expressed without any restraint, can always create dissensions in society. 
The insight that every particular standpoint or point of view represents a 
possible threat to the interest of the community as a whole is clearly formu-
lated by ancient Greek political authors, which “all insist that the state must 
stand outside class or other factional political interest” [Finley 1962: 6–7]. On 
the other hand, the politics of ancient Greece does not allow for a stasis which 
would take place on behalf of the whole, which is characteristic of the modern 
concept of revolution. Neither does Hobbes know of the latter concept, which 
is one of the reasons why he remains the last genuine theorist of civil war [cf. 
Koselleck 1995: 71–72].
However, as opposed to Hobbes, who believed that the danger of sedition 
and civil war 
could be prevented only by absolute subjection to sovereign power, which 
amounts to doing away with politics altogether, Greek democracy is best un-
derstood as an attempt to head off that danger by establishing a political mech-
anism for majority decision-making. It was observed that the vote in demo-
cratic Athens was a prophylactic against civil war (polemos epidêmios) [Glotz 
1929: 56]. This solution to the problem did not involve the complete elimination 
of political dissensus, which would later be accomplished in the absolutist state. 
On the contrary, it makes sense to say that Athens “was content to effect from 
day to day in the Assembly and the tribunal a fragmentary and piece-meal 
revolution” [Glotz 1929: 324]. This explains why the agonistic view of man 
remains relevant in the Greek political mentality not only for war but also for 
peace [Vernant 2007: 635] and has no negative implications whatsoever.
All of this, however, applies only to the Classical period, marked by the 
existence of the polis as the basic form of organization of state life. In Thucy-
dides’ time, the polis was already on the way of disappearance as an independent 
political unit. Its decline can also account for the fact that Thucydides was able 
to be a great admirer of Pericles as a man and political leader and, at the same 
time, an ardent critic of Athenian democracy, in particular of its orators and 
demagogues. Hobbes, as is known, favoured the latter aspect of Thucydides’ 
work – among other things, he wrote that he had translated his history in order 
to warn his countrymen not to succumb to the dangerous influence of demo-
cratically-minded rhetoricians [Hobbes 1839: I, lxxxviii]. However, another point 
is of interest in our context: with the decadence of the polis, the borderline 
between polemos and stasis becomes unstable.
The two concepts cannot be rigorously distinguished in Thucydides’ his-
tory. Having in mind the devastating experience of the Peloponnesian War 
itself, Plato would later say that every war between the Hellenes is in reality a 
civil war – stasis and not polemos [Plato 1930: I, 494–497]. The Peloponnesian 
War once and for all destroyed the old bonds of protection and allegiance between 
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Greek poleis, especially between metropolises and their colonies, as well as 
the traditional kinship and customary ties within Greek tribes [PW IV: 110–117]. 
It put an end to the earlier Greek logic of belonging, which was based on filiation 
and shared cultural background, and replaced it with a system of wavering 
political alliances. Thucydides gave an impressive depiction of the consequences 
of these changes, which affected even military operations. For example, during 
the Sicilian expedition, the singing of paeans by their Dorian allies caused the 
biggest disarray in the ranks of the Athenians, who were Ionians: “Whenever 
/…/ the Argives or the Corcyraeans or any other contingent of the Athenian 
army would raise the paean, the Athenians were just as much terrified thereby 
as when the enemy sang. And so finally, when once they had been thrown into 
confusion, coming into collision with their own comrades in many different 
parts of the army, friends with friends and citizens with fellow-citizens, they 
not only became panic-stricken but came to blows with one another and were 
with difficulty separated” [PW IV: 88–89].
The difficulty of distinguishing between stasis and interstate war is evi-
dent in the very composition of Thucydides’ history. During the war between 
enemy poleis, the threat of internal strife is constantly hanging in the air. Thus, 
for example, the oligarchic government of Melos in the abovementioned dialogue 
refuses to debate on the Athenian ultimatum before the assembly out of fear of 
a possible popular uproar in the city [PW III: 154–157]. In reverse, the first book 
of Thucydides’ history makes it clear that political strife in the polis constantly 
invites the intervention of the most powerful external players, Athens on the 
side of the people’s party, Corinth or Sparta on the side of the oligarchic regimes 
[PW I: 42–57, 148–167]. In Thucydides’ work, there is a constant shift between 
depictions of interstate and intrastate war and transition between the two. 
This indiscernibility between polemos and stasis makes Thucydides’ work 
all the more relevant today, with regard to the condition the of modern world, 
which can be described in terms of a “world civil war”, unconstrained by na-
tional boundaries. 
HOBBES AND STASIS IN CORCYRA
Despite the fact that the Peloponnesian War saw internal conflicts with 
more significant consequences, such as the stasis in Athens, Thucydides’ most 
famous depiction concerns the civil strife of Corcyra, which, in fact, preceded 
the outbreak of the war itself [PW II: 124–151; cf. Price 2004: 304–327]. It was 
rightly remarked that these pages include the most comprehensive author’s 
comments that can be found in Thucydides’ entire work [Orwin 1988: 833]. In 
a way, Thucydides justified the attention he devoted to this particular case of 
stasis by emphasizing that it was “among the first that occurred” and that its 
brutality seemed all the greater since it was novel [PW II: 142–143]. As we 
shall see, the description of the civil war in Corcyra was of great interest for 
Hobbes, although he didn’t treat it thematically.
Thucydides presents the genesis of the conflict in Corcyra near the begin-
ning of his book, almost immediately after the general remarks on its goals 
and method [PW I: 42–79]. One of the events that led to the war was the conflict 
between Corcyra and Corinth over the control of a Corcyraean colony, Epid-
amnus, today’s Durrës in Albania. That polis had also experienced civil war 
between the people’s party and the aristocracy. The years-long internal conflicts 
were temporarily ended by the victory of the people and exile of the nobility. 
However, foreign powers then interfered in the conflict: first Corcyra, whose 
army fought on the side of the people, then Corinth, which supported the aris-
tocrats. The conflict was subsequently extended to other participants as well 
– not only to Peloponnesian cities with a Dorian population, but also to poleis 
outside Peloponnesus, such as Megara in Attica, which entered into an alliance 
with Corinth, and Athens, whose fleet intervened on the side of Corcyra, and 
against Corinth, to support democracy. Finally, the Lacedaemonian assembly 
voted that the Athenian involvement in the conflict over Epidamnus consti-
tuted a breach of the peace treaty between Athens and Sparta, thereby declar-
ing war against Athens [PW I: 148–149]. The decision was preceded by the 
aforementioned negotiations at Sparta.
The Corinthians had significantly contributed to the outbreak of the stasis 
in Corcyra. They set free the Corcyraeans whom they had earlier captured in 
the battles over Epidamnus, hoping that they would get their fellow citizens to 
come over to the side of Corinth and its allies. Thucydides says that the Cor-
inthians had treated the prisoners with consideration from the very beginning, 
with that intention [PW I: 92–93]. Indeed, when they came back to Corcyra, 
these men started to stir up the citizens against Athens and the people’s party 
which was in power. The Corcyraean senate first voted that the city should 
maintain the alliance with Athens, but also decided to renew the friendship 
with the Peloponnesians. However, open hostilities and armed clashes between 
“the many” (hoi poloi) and “the few” (hoi oligoi) started when the pro-Corin-
thian partisans of the oligarchic government killed the leader of the people’s 
party, who was the Athenian proxenos, along with many other members of the 
senate. The conspirators justified their deed by their intention to keep Corcyra 
from falling into Athenian slavery [PW II: 126–131]. At first, their party had 
some success in the battles, but the situation then turned in favour of the peo-
ple, which won a provisional victory. The efforts of the exiled members of the 
nobility to overthrow the people from power went on until their final destruction, 
which Thucydides describes later [PW II: 292–297]. 
The victory of the dêmos was of great significance for the further course 
of the war because it ensured the alliance with Corcyra for the Athenian ex-
pedition to Sicily. However, what is important for us in the present context is 
the nature of political events which Thucydides described. The opposing sides 
in Corcyra were fighting each other by all means and to total extermination. 
Not only citizens took part in the battles which were fought in the city streets. 
The oligarch party hired barbarian mercenaries from Illyria, while the major-
ity of the slaves joined the people. Even women participated in the battles by 
throwing tiles from roofs. Their backs against the wall, the oligarchs didn’t 
refrain from setting fire to buildings, which threatened to burn down the whole 
city. Even the Athenians, allies of the people’s party, failed in an attempt to 
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stop the hostilities between the two opposing parties. From time to time, there 
seemed to be readiness to reach a mutual compromise in order to save the city, 
but with each turn of events, such as the departure of the enemy or the approach 
of the allied fleet, the procession of crimes and atrocities would resume its 
course. The difference between the private and the public ceased to exist. 
Creditors were ruthlessly slain on grounds of personal interest by those who 
owed them money with the excuse that they had planned to overthrow the 
democracy. Neither divine nor human laws applied any more, and anomy pre-
vailed in the city. Sanctuaries were desecrated: murders were committed in 
temples or in front of them, since the right of suppliants was no longer re-
spected. Party affiliation mattered more than loyalty to closest family members, 
so that fathers killed their own sons [PW II: 140–141]. 
As Thucydides suggests, in the state of lawlessness and anarchy of civil 
war, men who adhere to moral norms most often lose their life, and the issue 
of justice in relations between individuals is completely set aside. In a similar 
way, the question of justice had been rejected as irrelevant by the Athenians 
at Melos: according to their standpoint, justice could be discussed only among 
equals, and not in cases when there exists an important difference in power 
between the two sides [PW III: 158–159]. However, in the internal war which 
was fought in Corcyra, justice was brought into question in an even more 
fundamental way. Whenever stasis broke out, all agreements, promises and 
even solemn oaths would lose their binding power. Since they were given 
under the pressure of unfavorable circumstances, no one abided to them longer 
than their current interest required. Eventually, all trust among people disap-
peared: if it existed at all, it did not stem from respect for the law but from 
complicity in its transgression. All alliances were temporary and there was no 
permanent loyalty [PW II: 144–145].
Thucydides ended this account with his own observations [PW II: 142–151]. 
They seem to express his point of view more clearly than any other passage of 
the work. However, they contain no trace of an intention of putting all the blame 
for committed atrocities on one of the conflicting sides, or even an attempt at 
comparing their magnitude. Besides, any discussion regarding the morality or 
justice of either of the two parties is excluded from Thucydides’ own consid-
erations. In this regard, his impartiality as a historian is irreproachable, but 
was it the only reason of his abstaining from moral judgment? 
Hobbes wanted to go further: he was able to draw some fundamental con-
clusions from Thucydides. Civil war, just like the “state of nature”, precludes 
justice. According to Hobbes, speaking about justice presupposes the existence 
of law, which is nothing but the command of the sovereign power, whose most 
important task consists precisely in putting an end to the state of nature, or 
civil war. This is what Hobbes’ imperative theory of law is about: “Before there 
was any government, just and unjust had no being, their nature only being rela-
tive to some command: and every action in its own nature is indifferent; that it 
becomes just or unjust, proceeds from the right of the magistrate” [EW II: 151].
One more thing is important. Thucydides’ concluding remarks suggest 
that one of the main effects of civil war is corruption and, more precisely, the 
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inversion of the established social standards, values and norms. The transforma-
tions are the most striking in the domain of language as the most fundamental 
social convention. Habitual meanings of moral terms are inverted: “reckless 
audacity” is now considered as “courageous loyalty to party”, and impulsiveness 
as courage. At the same time, prudence is defamed as cowardice, and moderation 
as weakness. Shrewdness and deception are particularly appreciated as proof of 
cleverness and dexterity. On the contrary, simplicity (to euêthes), which Thucy-
dides considered as an essential ingredient of virtue, is ridiculed. Party interest 
and private profit are veiled under noble names and slogans, such as “political 
equality for the masses under the law” on the side of the people’s party, or 
“temperate aristocracy” on the side of aristocrats [PW II: 144–149].
These passages offer several early examples of paradiastole, a figure of 
speech by means of which “similar things are distinguished from each other”, 
as Quintilian would later define it [Skinner 1996: 150]. Ever since its origins 
in antiquity, the use of paradiastole has been of special interest in the world of 
human affairs, i.e. in politics and morality. That figure of speech represents a 
powerful rhetorical device of redescription of moral terms, and thus of revalu-
ation of moral facts. We find it at work in Thucydides. To the extent that “reck-
less audacity” truly has something in common with “courageous loyalty”, 
actions or characters which are usually described by the first term may be 
brought under the latter one and thereby justified, or vice versa, according to 
the interest of the speaker in each case [Skinner 1996: 161].
Hobbes took Thucydides’ examples seriously. He probably had them in 
mind when he wrote in Leviathan that “force” and “fraud” are two “cardinal 
virtues” in war [Hobbes 1968: 188]. The essay on Thucydides in which Hobbes 
relates the circumstances of his life already hints at the inversion of meanings 
which occurred in the civil war in Corcyra. However, Hobbes considers this 
inversion to be characteristic of democracy: according to him, Thucydides de-
cided to withdraw from public life because the people of his time had such a high 
opinion of their own power, that only those who encouraged them to “the most 
dangerous and hopeless enterprises” were held in esteem as statesmen, while 
“he that gave them temperate and discreet advice, was thought a coward, or not 
to understand, or else to malign their power” [EW VIII: xvi; Skinner 1996: 282].
Corruption of language is more than just another symptom of overall 
moral deterioration – it is also one of its main instruments. That is the reason 
why Hobbes saw great danger in the alteration of the meanings of words by 
demagogues and rhetoricians. His insistence on the principle that ambiguity 
should be avoided by giving precise definitions of terms, which we encounter 
in his later systematic works, is not only explained by his scientific mentality, 
but has political grounds too. For Hobbes, linguistic ambiguities are a source 
of disputes and even of armed conflict: “Metaphors, and senselesse and am-
biguous words, are like ignes fatui; and reasoning upon them, is wandering 
amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or 
contempt” [Hobbes 1968: 116–117].
In order to eliminate this danger, it is necessary to determine the mean-
ings of words. In all cases where disagreement in respect of their definition or 
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use can endanger peace, the decision which settles the issue belongs to public 
authority [EW II: 268–269]. It is particularly urgent to fix the meaning of words 
in the domain of politics and morals, in which they are fluid and value-loaded 
at the same time, as in the case of names of virtues and vices. As Hobbes be-
lieved, the sense of moral terms cannot be reduced to their objective content 
or the nature of things to which they refer, but depends on the viewpoint of the 
speaker, which is precisely the reason why these terms often provoke discord 
between people. The examples which Hobbes cites are typical cases of para-
diastole. They are almost literally taken from Thucydides: “one man calleth 
wisdom, what another calleth feare; and one cruelty, what another justice; one 
prodigality, what another magnanimity; and one gravity, what another stupid-
ity” [Hobbes 1968: 109]. The task of defining the “real” meaning belongs to 
the sovereign power: as his imperative theory of law, Hobbes’ moral emotivism 
[cf. EW IV: 109] is closely related to his political doctrine of sovereignty. 
WHAT DOES STASIS REVEAL TO US?
As the main causes of the unfortunate events in Corcyra, Thucydides 
singled out two human passions – greed (pleonexia) and ambition (philotimia), 
which stem from excessive party zeal (prothymon) [PW II: 146–147]. In civil 
strife, these devastating passions know no limits, so that the conflict becomes 
emulation in wickedness which casts away all scruples and brings to nothing 
all moral and religious norms. This gives rise to the question: is civil war any-
thing else but a limit situation in which human nature openly manifests itself, 
whereas it remains hidden in time of public peace and tranquillity?
The arguments in favour of this view are substantial. The civil war in 
Corcyra undeniably has a privileged place in the composition of The Pelopon-
nesian War, which Thucydides composed as a “possession for all time”. He 
intended his work to be read by those who “wish to have a clear view both of 
the events which have happened and of those which will some day, in all hu-
man probability (kata to anthrôpinon), happen again in the same or a similar 
way” [PW I: 40–41]. He uses almost identical terms in his account of the events 
in Corcyra: the horrors which happened there “happen and always will happen 
while human nature (physis anthrôpôn) is the same” [PW II: 142–143].
These words might lead us to think that Thucydides considered man as 
brutal and unjust by nature. However, the continuation of the same sentence 
proves that this conclusion would be wrong: human nature6 is “severer or 
milder”, according to the circumstances, which are particularly unfavorable in 
wartime. War is a “violent teacher” (biaios didaskalos), which in most people 
arouses passions that correspond to its own character, but in times of peace, 
states, as well as individuals, have “higher morals” [PW II: 142–143].
Thucydides’ statements about human nature are frequently explained by 
the influence of rhetoricians and sophists of his time: according to tradition, 
Thucydides was a disciple of Antiphon, Gorgias and Prodicus [Romilly 2002: 150, 
6 We follow Hobbes’ translation here [EW VIII: 348].
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152–154]. The antithesis between nature (physis) and law (nomos), which we 
encounter in the speech of the Athenian embassy at Melos, was widely exploited 
by the sophists. However, this antithesis does not exactly correspond to what 
Thucydides says about human nature in the chapters on stasis in Corcyra. The 
difference between men such as they are during civil war and men in happier, 
peaceful times does not coincide with the opposition of nature and law. Thucydides 
rather seems to suggest that human nature itself shows itself as deeply am-
biguous, capable of different interpretations, according to the circumstances.
This means that it would be wrong to believe that people are bad or bru-
tal by nature and that civil war only reveals this fact. The statement that Thucy-
dides understood human nature as a “source and place of regression at the same 
time” [Loraux 1995: 322] seems exaggerated and all too Christian as well. 
According to Thucydides, human nature is not evil, but rather essentially un-
stable, precarious and dependent on circumstances, which also suggests that 
the circumstances in which men live should be made as good as possible.
Nevertheless, it is indisputable that Thucydides defined his standpoint in 
opposition to idealized representations of man in poetry and mythology [PW 
I: 38–41]. If this attitude did not stem from sophistic teachings, how can we 
explain it? In fact, it has its roots in the conceptions of Ionian physicists, who 
were also adversaries of mythology. As Jaeger observed, “Thucydides won his 
great intellectual victory by transferring that scientific attitude from timeless 
nature to the political struggle of his own age, darkened and confused with 
passions and party-interests” [Jaeger 1973: 388].
Hobbes’ approach to politics was also inspired by a new science of nature. 
That could explain his candid descriptions of the nature of man. Carl Schmitt 
had Hobbes in mind, among others, when he wrote that “all genuine political 
theories presuppose man to be evil” and spoke of their anthropological pes-
simism [Schmitt 1996: 61]. And then there is religion. Hobbes used to defend 
himself from accusations for his uncomplimentary concept of human nature 
by hiding behind the authority of the Holy Bible and its central notion of man 
as a fallen and corrupt being [EW II: xv–xvi]. In the light of his reputation as 
the atheistic “Beast of Malmesbury”, this tactic must have seemed a mere 
provocation to his contemporaries. So instead of Hobbes’ pessimism, it may 
be more appropriate to speak of his anthropological realism, just as in the case 
of Thucydides.
Interestingly enough, Hobbes tried to defend Thucydides from the accusa-
tion of atheism. In his record of Thucydides’ life and work, Hobbes mentioned 
that he was, as well as Socrates, a disciple of the philosopher Anaxagoras, the 
last of the Ionian physicists, whose opinions, “being of a strain above the ap-
prehension of the vulgar, procured him the estimation of an atheist”, which 
finally cost him his life. The same reputation led to the death of Socrates, and 
cast a shadow on Thucydides’ name too, although he was not an atheist [EW 
VIII: xv]. But couldn’t it be that three of them were atheists – Anaxagoras, 
Thucydides and Hobbes? 
There is no simple answer to this question. However, it is clear that Hob-
bes, like Thucydides, but differently from Socrates, founded his conception of 
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man on a science which regards nature as indifferent to human goals. For 
Hobbes, this science was the Galilean mechanics, according to which he mod-
eled his Civil Science as a study having for its object the movement of the large 
political “body”. Certainly, the nature of 17th century physics is not identical 
to that of the Ionian physicists. Nonetheless, both sciences had a similar, sober-
ing effect on the conception of human nature and the place of man in the world.
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